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Abstract 
 
While recent research has explored the phenomenon of drug parallel trade in regulated 
environments such as the European Union (EU), or the European Economic Area, little 
is known about the mechanisms that explain its origin or the role of the distribution 
chain in exporting and importing countries in determining its extent. By building on 
theoretical literature explaining the role of the distribution chain, this paper draws on an 
empirical specification of a gravity model to examine the determinants of inter-country 
flows of parallel-traded drugs. In this context, the paper deals with the effect of 
differences in the regulation of and competition in the distribution chain in the countries 
of origin and destination. The paper draws on proprietary data from the Intercontinental 
Medical Statistics database (for the Netherlands and other EU countries that export to 
the Netherlands) which identify the country of origin of parallel-imported medicines 
from 1997-2002 for a therapeutic group (statins) for which there is no generic 
competition. The study reveals that although parallel trade is a specific form of 
arbitrage, it is primarily a regulation-induced phenomenon. As a result, although the 
driving force for parallel trade is price differences across countries, the propagation 
mechanism lies in (a) the way drug prices are regulated across countries and (b) 
fragmentation and the underlying incentive structure in the wholesale distribution chain 
in countries where drug prices are regulated. The implications that flow from our study 
are that a more flexible and competitive and less fragmented (along national borders) 
distribution chain, particularly at wholesale level, might reduce the extent of and 
potential for parallel trade.  
 
Key words: parallel trade, arbitrage, pharmaceuticals, economic integration, price 
regulation, vertical integration and drug distribution. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The development of a single European market and the free movement of goods 
encourage arbitrage opportunities whereby price differences for particular goods across 
countries can be reduced or minimised. Due to significant cross country price 
differences, one such opportunity is parallel trade of in-patent pharmaceuticals1. The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has on several occasions ruled on its validity (Kanavos 
and Costa-Font, 2005), and the principle of regional exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights supports it (Forrester, 2002). Recent evidence suggests that pharmaceutical 
parallel trade has risen quite significantly (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005), and its 
extent has been attributed to price differences for in-patent medicines across countries, 
arising from price regulatory practices (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005; Szymanski and 
Valetti, 2005; Jelovac and Borodoy, 2005 and Peccorino, 2002). Indeed, the regulation 
of drug prices by national health insurance agencies suggests that price differences will 
continue to exist long after arbitrage has commenced, thus making this practice an 
imperfect form of arbitrage.  
 
While the phenomenon of pharmaceutical parallel trade has been analysed both 
theoretically (Malueg and Schwartz, 1994; Richardson 2002, Chen and Maskus 2005, 
Maskus and Chen, 2002, Szymanski and Valetti, 2005) and empirically (Ganslandt and 
Maskus, 2004), and its impact on different stakeholders explored (Kanavos and Costa-
Font, 2005), the role of the distribution chain in its proliferation and perpetuation 
remains under-researched. As pharmaceutical manufacturers cannot sell directly to 
patients and have to rely on wholesalers and retailers to distribute and dispense 
medicines respectively, clearly, the degree of vertical control that manufacturers can 
legally exert over the latter influences the extent to which wholesalers can divert 
products from one country, where prices are low, to another, where prices (and therefore 
rents) are higher.  
 
Under a regime of regional exhaustion, such as the one in place within the European 
Economic Area, intellectual property rights do not confer legitimate control of the 
product final destination upon sale in one country, and thus if price differences arise, 
                                                 
1 Parallel trade refers to the movement of a drug from a specific market A to a market B – where the drug 
is already under circulation through official distribution channels – but distributed in parallel distribution 
channels to official ones.  
 4 
 
parallel trade takes place. As expected, parallel trade, as any other form of arbitrage 
results theoretically from price differences being higher than transport and transaction 
costs, such as those resulting from obtaining a parallel distribution licence, as well as 
exchange rate variability (Rose, 2000). Consequently, parallel trade is perceived as a 
market mechanism to smooth existing price dispersion at a certain point in time that 
results from discriminatory monopolist strategies across countries (Weigand, 1991) or 
currency rate fluctuations. However, the case in the pharmaceutical sector is arguably 
different, given that cross-country price differences in drug prices result from 
differences in price regulation (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005) as well as differences in 
the regulation of the distribution chain. 
 
This paper analyses the impact that different price regulatory regimes and the market 
and incentive structures of drug distribution systems across countries are having on the 
amplitude and extent of pharmaceutical parallel trade. Proprietary data are used to 
examine the impact of cross border price regulation and the drug distribution system on 
pharmaceutical parallel imports from other European Union (EU) countries into the 
Netherlands. Knowing with precision the source countries for such exports has allowed 
the use of a gravity approach. This is the first time that a gravity model has been 
employed to evaluate the determinants of bilateral flows of pharmaceutical trade, 
although gravity models have been employed to evaluate the trade potential of 
integration processes. As some studies reveal (Egger, 2000; 2002) cross-sectional 
gravity models might be misspecified given that exporter- and importer-specific effects 
may well be in place. This paper performs panel data analysis to capture part of the 
unobserved heterogeneity in measuring specific parallel trade determinants.  
 
Section 2 provides some background information on pharmaceutical parallel trade and 
discusses the market structure of the distribution chain in different EU countries. 
Section 3 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of parallel trade and arbitrage in the 
context of a gravity model. Section 4 presents the methodology, data sources and the 
approach followed in the analysis, while section 5 presents results and discusses policy 
implications. Finally, section 6 draws the main conclusions. 
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2. Parallel trade of medicines and drug distribution  
 
Within the European Economic Area, the development of a single market, the 
implementation of a community exhaustion of IPR, the removal of nominal exchange 
rate variability in those countries that have joined the European single currency, 
together with a number of decisions by the European Court of Justice have fostered the 
development of pharmaceutical parallel trade, despite the legality of a parallel trade ban 
having being questioned unsuccessfully by arguing that vertical control should be a 
natural extension of intellectual property rights (Barfield and Groombridge, 1998). 
Empirical evidence, however, questions the capacity of parallel trade to achieve price 
equalisation in the European pharmaceutical market (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005). 
Prior studies on parallel trade have analysed country-specific flows (Ganslandt and 
Maskus, 2004), but have not taken into account the presence of generic drugs and price 
and reimbursement regulation both in importing and exporting countries. Previous 
literature remains inconclusive about the capacity of parallel trade to increase the 
country’s welfare (Mauleg and Schwartz, 1994, Richardson, 2002). Indeed, the 
normative implications for welfare of increasing parallel trade are ambiguous and 
tightly dependent on the benefits of a unitary price as compared to a price 
discrimination equilibrium (Szymanski and Valletti, 2005).  
 
One of the lesser-explored areas in the literature is the structural determinants of parallel 
imported drugs across countries. On the one hand, retail price differences might not well 
capture the way drug distributors are reimbursed in each country. On the other hand, 
price differences at wholesale level across countries are the result of different 
competitive conditions in drug distribution (e.g. larger number of companies) that, in 
turn, motivate a lower price in such a country, but those differences alone do not 
necessarily explain the motivation for parallel trade. Thus, in countries where drug 
wholesalers are subject to more stringent competitive conditions they have an incentive 
to ship part of their stock of medicines to another country where the competitive 
conditions are less stringent. Recent contributions stress the importance of price 
differences at ex-manufacturer level (Maskus and Chen, 2004; Chen and Maskus, 2005) 
and point out that the (theoretical) determinants of parallel trade depend on the vertical 
formation of drug prices. Finally, the analysis of trade flows is based on the 
specification of a gravity equation (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), taking into 
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account the joint population and economic size of the two areas (since the destination 
(original) country dimension determines higher potential volume of drugs sales 
(distribution)) as well as their distance (given that the higher the distance the higher the 
transport costs, although this very much depends on the specification of the transport 
costs function). Table 1 provides some descriptive evidence on the differences in the 
regulation of prices and the wholesaling competitive conditions across European 
countries. We find that in France wholesaler margins are the lowest in 2005 followed by 
other southern European countries. Southern European countries show a significantly 
higher fragmentation in their wholesaling and retailing practices compared to other 
European countries.  
 
 
Table 1 
Pharmaceutical price structure and distribution chain market structure in selected 
EU countries, 2005 
 
Country Ex-
Manufacturer2 
(% price) 
Number of 
wholesalers 
Wholesaler 
margin 
(% price)3 
Pharmacy 
density 
(Population per 
pharmacy) 
Pharmacy 
margin 
(% price)3 
Belgium 56.6 13 8.5 5,200 29.2 
France 64.8 121 3.8 2,800 26.2 
Germany 51.2 16 7.7 3,900 27.3 
Greece  63.1 130 5.5 1,420 24 
Italy  63.8 951 6.7 3,700 20.4 
Netherlands 63.4 4 10.8 6,100 20.2 
Portugal 67.8 18 8.4 4,000 19 
Spain 62.7 51 6.7 2,000 26.8 
UK 72.4 10 10.3 4,850 17.3 
Note:  1 Excluding regional offices and counting only head offices of the same wholesaler. 
 2 Ex-manufacturer price as a proportion of price, assuming price=100. 
 3 Margins expressed as a proportion of price, assuming price=100. 
Sources: Paterson et al, 2003a; European Association of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, 2005. 
 
 
3. Parallel trade: a gravity approach  
 
3.1 Theoretical considerations 
 
Despite parallel trade often being defined as a specific form of arbitrage (Maskus and 
Chen, 2005; Malueg and Schwartz, 2004), predictions of arbitrage theory do not seem to 
be backed by empirical evidence (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005). One explanation 
refers to the possibility of an accommodative equilibrium by drug companies 
(Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004), whilst alternative explanations rest on the incentives 
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resulting from country-specific regulations affecting both the probability of undertaking 
parallel trade and the emergence of long-lasting price differences across countries. In 
pharmaceuticals, regulatory interventions at national level maintain price differences 
over time (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005). Therefore, prices do not necessarily reflect 
differences in purchasing powers across countries2.  
 
One of the likely sources of parallel trade in individual countries is the country’s 
‘economic size’. The larger a particular market, the more attractive it is for both 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and parallel distributors to undertake production and 
trade respectively. Most European counties, whether parallel importing or parallel 
exporting, operate with a single payer (national health insurance) who negotiates rates 
and purchases drugs on behalf of the health care system3. Assuming that payers regulate 
prices of pharmaceuticals (Peccorino, 2002; Mossialos and Mrazek, 2004) then, ceteris 
paribus, the larger a country market size the higher the potential bargaining power of 
the payer. Manufacturers may follow a dual strategy in this case: they can either deter 
parallel trade by setting a sufficiently low (high) price in a high (low) price country such 
that it would make it unprofitable to perform parallel trade; or, alternatively, they can 
accommodate parallel trade simply by allowing parallel distribution to take place 
without necessarily taking action on prices. When arbitrage is unlimited then deterrence 
is more profitable than accommodation. Conversely, accommodation emerges when the 
potential volume of arbitrage is small and trade costs are relatively high (Ganslandt and 
Maskus, 2004).  
 
It may well be the case, however, that pharmaceutical parallel trade results from lack of 
barriers to arbitrage such as the lack of total vertical control in the pharmaceutical 
distribution chain by the manufacturer. This lack is not self-imposed, but governed by 
regulation, so that the most widely-used model of distribution has to be that the 
manufacturer sells to the wholesaler and the latter to a retailer (pharmacy). However, 
there are some exemptions to this model, but only relating to the structure of the 
distribution chain itself, namely, some countries allow a degree of vertical integration 
between wholesalers and retailers, whereas others allow some horizontal integration 
                                                 
2 On the other hand, parallel trade might well have an endogenous effect on innovation and, subsequently, 
on the launch of new products by pharmaceutical manufacturers (Szymanski and Valletti, 2006). 
3 Hence, it may well be the case that country size determines the country’s monopsony power in price 
negotiation. 
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amongst wholesalers or retailers (Mossialos and Mrazek, 2003). Maintaining vertical 
restraints implies substantial transaction and information costs and, as a result, weak 
distribution control, combined with a fragmented wholesaler structure, leads to 
wholesalers in low-price countries channeling part of their stocks to high-price 
countries. In addition, exercising a significant degree of vertical control was deemed up 
until very recently to be illegal by the European Court of Justice4.  
 
Parallel imports have been modeled as being the result of third degree price 
discrimination (Mauleg and Schawartz, 1994); however, they may well be the effect of 
second degree price discrimination, for example resulting from discounts given by 
parallel distributors to pharmacists in importing countries (Anderson and Ginsburgh, 
1999). Empirically, the existence of a mechanism that allows health insurance to retain 
part of that discount in the UK and the Netherlands, confirms this assumption (Kanavos 
and Costa-Font, 2005). The motivations behind parallel trade have been modeled in 
recent theoretical work (Maskus and Chen, 2002; Maskus and Chen, 2004; Chen and 
Maskus, 2005). Indeed, the theoretical predictions of this stream of literature are that 
parallel trade takes place due to the lack of vertical control. Parallel distributors tend to 
be either distributors or agents that purchase from authorised distributors, therefore 
changes in the wholesaler price and competitive conditions in the distribution chain are 
likely to determine the profitability of the parallel trade business.  
 
Let us now consider the price of a manufacturer monopolist selling a product (drug) to a 
set of distinct markets, i, subject to regulation (which can potentially influence the 
product price), thus is the price in each market for a specific product which we 
assume is not subject to generic competition, but only subject to potential competition 
from parallel distributors. Individuals’ utility is measured by using a model of vertical 
product differentiation to represent consumer preferences in each market. Assume 
ijp
                                                 
4 On 6 January 2004, the European Court of Justice dismissed the appeal by the European Commission 
and others (Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure and Commission of the European Communities v 
Bayer AG) against a judgment of the Court of First Instance in Bayer (Adalat) (Bayer AG v Commission 
of the European Communities). The ECJ benchmark is the Adalat case ruling which allowed 
manufacturers indirectly to control their stocks in different countries and, therefore, implicitly monitor the 
behaviour of wholesalers, so long as such monitoring would not result in explicit agreements between 
manufacturers and wholesalers restricting the free movement of goods across borders. 
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further that the manufacturer has access to and sells a drug in two countries5. Further 
assume that the principle of regional exhaustion holds, therefore it is not possible to 
prevent products from one country being sold to the other, and refers to the 
transportation and/or transaction costs of any bilateral parallel trade. In both countries 
sales take place through independent distributors, who purchase from manufacturers and 
a share of the drug sold in one country can be diverted to the other country, based on 
price differences between the two. The total volume of the product sold in each country 
is given by  
0≥t
 
i
j
i
ii qnqQ +=  (1) 
 
which is the addition of the locally sourced product in country i and what is imported 
from country j, and where n refers to the number of wholesalers. The manufacturer’s 
marginal cost is assumed to be null and the wholesaler price in each country is  
 
)( iiwiwi nqpp =  (2) 
 
Parallel distributors maximise a profit function which can be expressed as the wholesale 
price difference between the two countries ( wjwi pp − ) and the transaction cost times the 
volume of parallel trade ( ): ijq
 
( ) ( )[ ] ijjjjwjiiiwiij qtqnpqnp *−−=π  (3) 
 
and hence if 0≥∂
∂
i
j
i
j
q
π
, parallel trade will take place until the wholesale price 
difference in the two countries equals the transport costs t. Given that 0≤∂
∂
i
wi
n
p  and 
0≤∂
∂
j
wj
n
p
, the higher the number of wholesalers, theoretically, the higher the 
                                                 
5 This facilitated by the existence of a pan European licence through the European Medicines Evaluation 
Agency. 
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competition in each distribution sector, and the lower the prices in each respective 
country6.  
 
3.2 The gravity model  
Based on equation (3), bilateral flows of parallel traded drugs can be specified by using 
a gravity model. The gravity model of international trade flows has been widely used as 
a baseline model for estimating the impact of a variety of policy issues related to 
regional trading groups, currency unions and various trade distortions (Bougheas, 
Demetriades and Morgenroth, 1999; De Grauwe and Skudelny 2000; Glink and Rose 
2002). Following Newton’s gravity law, a reduced form of spatial flows could be 
specified, incorporating both demand and supply factors along with trade barriers such 
as distance and other common preference factors. This predicts that the flow of goods 
between two locations is positively related to their size (or income levels) and negatively 
related to the distance between them, after controlling for a number of other factors 
which might affect trade through the gravity model (price differences, differences in the 
competitive pressures of certain regulatory frameworks as promoting parallel trade and 
the size of the market as an indication of the potential demand and thus profits from 
parallel trade).  
Parallel distributors aim at maximising an expected profit function (Kanavos and Costa-
Font, 2005; Szymanzki and Valletti, 2005), such as the one showed in equation (3), and 
from this they are more likely to ship products to countries that are closer, and have 
higher prices compared to the countries of origin. Given that the relevant price for 
parallel traders is the wholesale price prevailing in any of the countries in question, the 
extent of parallel trade would depend, among other things, on a number of parameters 
related to drug distributors. The first is the nature of competition prevailing in the 
wholesale distribution business and the number of wholesalers. The second relates to 
the economic rents from wholesaling, in terms of margins accruing to each wholesale 
distributor as part of the product’s retail price, which in most European countries, are 
fixed by government regulation. Therefore, our research questions become: Do spatial 
determinants, regulation and non-gravity related aspects, such as price differences 
across countries, exchange rates, etc, explain cross-border bilateral flows of 
                                                 
6 This would hold, provided the market is unregulated. 
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pharmaceutical products? Is parallel trade different from conventional (non-regulation 
induced) trade? How does the model specification determine the magnitude of parallel 
traded flows?  
The model can be specified using a cross-sectional specification. Alternatively, panel 
data techniques offer more robust specifications. The specification defined raises a 
number of econometric issues: namely, the extent of inclusion of specific fixed effects, 
the existence of some endogenous variables, as well as measurement problems for 
certain regulation effects. In this paper we explore both the pool and the panel data 
model specification possibilities. An augmented logarithmic version of the traditional 
gravity equation that would follow from equation (3) to include geographic controls 
would give the following:  
 
[ ]
ijtijttji
tjjiiijttjiijtjioijt
XQQ
PYPYYYppM
εββ
βξββτβββ
++
+++++−+=
76
54321
)ln(
)/)(/(ln)()ln(ln
 (4) 
 
 where i and j denote the destination country and the country of origin or export 
country(-ies) respectively. The error term εij captures any other random shocks and 
unobserved events that may affect bilateral trade between the two countries. Gravity-
specific determinants include distance )( ijτ , the combined GDP ( ) of the two 
trading countries, the combined GDP per capita of the two trading countries 
, and the exchange rate (
jiYY
)/)(/( jjii PYPY ijξ ). Given that parallel trade is theoretically 
conceptualised as a specific type of arbitrage (Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004), it is 
arguably driven by the existence of a price difference between the two countries 
 and a volume effect in the form of total drugs from the specific therapeutic 
group of interest ( ). Finally, a number of key determinants are included in . 
These are as follows: first, the competition environment in the wholesaling sector, 
defined as the total number of wholesalers in each country and, second, the impact of 
drug distribution, defined as the difference in the margins of wholesalers and 
pharmacists between export and import country. Finally, 
)( ji pp −
jiQQ ijX
β  denotes the vector of 
coefficients and ijε  measures the set of other influences on bilateral parallel imports.  
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Table 2 
Variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description Mean s.e 
ijtM  Bilateral Import flow of statins (logs) a 1.513 0.096 
ijτ  Euclidean distance of latitude and longitude (in logs) of the country capitals 6.467 0.034 
ijtξ  Exchange rates in euros (logs)b 0.0679 0.037 [ ]
tjjii
PYPY )/)(/(ln
 
Product of per capita GDPs (logs)b 
(Y= DGP) and (P=population) 0.166 0.027 
tjiQQ )ln(  Product of total sales of statins (logs)a 21.359 0.045 
tjiYY )ln(  Product of GDPs (logs)b 20.161 0.008 
Entry 
Dummy variable measuring the entry of a new drug in the parallel trade 
marketa 0.283 0.016 
)ln( jtit pp −  Price difference between Netherlands and source country adjusted by defined daily doses (DDD)a 0.323 0.015 
Ln  tji NN )( + Sum of the total number of wholesalers (logs)c 1.265 0.022 
Ln tji )( ηη −  Percentage difference in wholesalers’ drug margins (logs)c 1.439 0.026 
Ln tji )( ρρ −  Percentage difference in pharmacist drug price margins (logs)c 0.528 0.030 
 
Note: Export Country (i), Import County (j) and time (t). 
Sources: a IMS data 1997-2002.  
bOECD Economic Outlook data 1997-2002.  
c EFPIA, several years (www.efpia.org).  
 
 
4. Data and methods 
 
We used the Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) database on a quarterly basis over 
the 1997-2002 period for a set of products that fall in the therapeutic product category 
of statins and exhibit parallel trade during the study period, resulting in a total sample 
size of N= 768 observations7. IMS collect data on prices and sales for a number of 
countries, including the Netherlands, and for the selected product group, statins, on a 
product-by-product (e.g. simvastatin, pravastatin, etc) and product presentation basis 
(e.g. simvastatin, 20mg, 28 tablets). The accuracy of the database’s sources has been 
validated externally (IMS, 2002). Pricing data are available at public level, i.e. inclusive 
of all wholesale and retail margins as well as Value Added Tax (VAT). Through official 
national sources, the relevant margins for wholesalers and retailers (pharmacists), as 
well as the statutory VAT rates applicable for prescription-only (POM) medicines can 
be indentified. The group selected for the analysis (statins) accounts for a significant 
                                                 
7 The number of observations is made up of 24 quarterly observations, 4 products and 8 export countries. 
Data for each product was made available at dispensation level.  
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proportion of total retail sales of prescription only medicines in European countries 
(5.7% in 2002) (Figure 1).  
 
Statins are drugs that lower levels of LDL ("bad") cholesterol by 30-50%, and have 
been increasingly prescribed for the (primary and secondary) prevention of coronary 
heart disease (CHD), including myocardial infarction (MI). Therefore, they are products 
whose importance in preventing heart disease is well-documented in the literature and 
their use has been increasing over time, making them, in turn, desirable targets for 
parallel trade (Kanavos et al, 2006). All drugs within the group were protected by a 
patent during the study period, therefore, the effect of parallel trade could be isolated 
from other effects, such as competition from generic equivalents, and studied without 
having to account for the competition effect due to generic penetration which may be 
significant (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005; Frank and Salkever, 1991; Grabowski and 
Vernon, 1992; Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004). 
 
We examined parallel import flows of statins into the Netherlands and were in a 
position to identify the source country for these imports. In this particular case, and for 
the above study period, the Netherlands parallel imported statins from Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. We were able to 
identify with precision the price and quantity differences at any point in time between 
each exporting country and the Netherlands, and estimate the impact of arbitrage in the 
Dutch market for each of the products within the statins group.  
 
In explaining trade flows, we consider the influence of price differences, given the 
arbitrage nature of parallel trade, the nature of competitive forces in the drug 
distribution system, and the cross national differences in wholesale price regulation. 
Recent studies (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005) already find that some of the gains from 
parallel trade are invisible because of the incentive structures of different stakeholders 
that play a key role in the distribution of medicines in general and parallel imported 
medicines in particular, most notably parallel distributors and pharmacies.  
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Figure 1 
Market share of statins in the retail market in six* European countries, 1997-2002 
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Source: The authors from IMS, 2004. 
*These include United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
  
In estimating the model presented in equation (4), we follow both a pooled (cross-
section) and a panel data approach to measure the impact of country-specific or time 
heterogeneity effects that can be modelled by including country-pair “individual” 
effects and, accordingly, identifying bilateral trade. Hence, the pooled (cross-section) 
specification contains a reduced form of equation (4), whilst the panel case refers to a 
random effects approach consistent with the gravity specification whereby some 
variables are country-specific (e.g. distance). In using the pooled approach, we are 
aware that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation ignores the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity resulting from unobserved characteristics related to bilateral trade 
relationships. Thus, a country would export different amounts of the same product to 
two other countries, even if their GDPs are identical and they are equidistant from the 
exporting country. This is due to potential differences in drug regulation, which are not 
entirely observed, along with the presence of country-specific heterogeneity. Since the 
cross-section OLS estimates may not be able to account for these heterogeneous factors, 
the results are likely to suffer from substantial heterogeneity bias8. In contrast, a panel-
based approach may be more desirable in order to deal with heterogeneity issues 
because the effects of such determinants can be modelled by including country-pair 
“individual” effects. In this case, a random effects approach would be more appropriate, 
                                                 
8 We nevertheless show the OLS results purely for comparative purposes. 
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whereas a fixed effects approach would not allow for estimating coefficients on time-
invariant variables such as distance or common language, though the consistent 
estimation of such effects is equally important in many situations. Finally, we separate 
the full model from the restricted model, following a two-part approach, whereby if we 
group all explanatory variables in βX  then, the conditional expectation of bilateral trade 
is:  
)/0()/0/()/( βββ XMprXMMEXME ijtijtijtijt >>=  (5) 
 
Hence, we can separate the entry decision into a market )/0/( βXMME ijtijt >  from the 
actual penetration of a market )/0( βXMpr ijt >  in order to disentangle potentially 
different explanatory effects.  
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of real imports of statins in the Netherlands and 
the logarithm of total trade volume in the country of origin. First, we use the basic 
specification and consider the impact of core explanatory variables such as GDP, 
population and distance. Subsequently, in line with recent theoretical developments 
(Egger, 2002), we include variables measuring the size of trading countries and other 
barriers that might explain the development of parallel trade such as distance and 
exchange rates. The model described in equation (4) contains variables that are 
potentially endogenous, namely the price difference between the Netherlands and each 
)/0( βXMpr ijt >  exporting country. We estimate two stage least squares (2SLS) and two 
stage generalised least squares (2SGLS) models to account for such effects. To 
instrument price differences between importing and exporting country we employ the 
difference in pharmacy mark-ups and the number of wholesalers as instruments as 
neither variable is associated with volume, but both help explain drug prices. Indeed, as 
discussed elsewhere (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005), incentives to purchase parallel 
traded drugs by wholesalers and pharmacies take place through unobservable discounts 
which, in the vast majority of cases, remain unaccounted for by health insurance. We 
use the Hausmann and the Davidson and McKinnon tests to confirm endogeneity in 
price formation and the Sargan test to check whether the model is over-identified. 
The variables employed in the analysis are presented in Table 2 and are as follows: (a) 
( ) is the observed volume of each statin imported into the Netherlands from another 
EU country; (b) (
ijtM
ijτ ), represents the distance between two areas and is defined as the 
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Euclidean distance of latitude and longitude between country capitals; the reason for 
measuring distance in this way rests on the fact that kilometres are not necessarily a 
good approximation for distance given alternative and more direct ways of 
transportation (e.g. air travel); (c) exchange rate ( ijtξ ) is an obvious determinant of 
parallel trade insofar as it impacts price transparency, especially in the context of 
European integration; (d) following the predictions of a gravity model, our model 
includes the product of country GDPs (in logs) [ ]
tjjii
PYPY )/)(/(ln , and the product of 
statins sales in € (in logs) ( ) that is the specific therapeutic group in question 
which has been growing in size during the study period; (e) furthermore, we consider 
the point of entry of a parallel traded drug or product presentation as a variable to select 
the sample under consideration. As expected from a model of arbitrage, price 
differences between countries (in logs) (
tjiQQ )ln(
)ln( jtit pp − ) should be a key determinant. 
Finally, (g) a set of variables has been added to measure the aggregate number of 
distributors, which accounts for the degree of competition in the distribution chain in 
both countries ( ) proxied by the sum of the number of wholesalers in the 
Netherlands and the exporting country and the (h) difference in the wholesaler 
(
tji NN )( +
tji )( ηη − ) and pharmacy mark-up difference ( tji )( ρρ − ) and account for possible 
economic incentives for parallel trade. 
 
5. Results  
 
Overall, there is evidence of an increase in parallel import penetration to the 
Netherlands post 1999 (Figure 2). Whilst this is initially attributable mainly to a single 
product (simvastatin), subsequently, other competitor statins increase their share in total 
statin imports. According to IMS, the market share of parallel imported statins is about 
30% over the study period.  
 
Figure 3 reports the patterns of trade from each of the potential countries of origin. The 
most common country of origin of parallel imported drugs in the Netherlands, at least in 
the earlier parts of the study period, was France. This is not totally unexpected although 
France does not have the lowest statin price among exporting countries. Significant 
exporting activity by France may be due to the fact that France is a large country with a 
significant capacity to parallel export (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005). At the same 
time, of all the other existing countries that can potentially export, France is, together 
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with Belgium, closest geographically to the Netherlands. Finally, the wholesale margin 
in France is the lowest of the countries considered (Table 1), and this can be interpreted 
as an incentive for wholesalers to divert part of their stocks to other countries, seeking 
higher returns.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Parallel trade penetration of statins in the Netherlands (parallel imports as a % of 
total product market), 1997-2002 
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Source: The authors from IMS, 2004. 
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The evidence presented in Figure 3 suggests that although 90% of parallel imported 
statins into the Netherlands were sourced in France in 1997, Spain’s market share has 
increased significantly since 2000. By 2002 Spanish exports accounted for 40% of all 
statins parallel imported into the Netherlands.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Origin of parallel imported statins in the Netherlands, 1997-2002 
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Source: The authors from IMS, 2004. 
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Table 3 
Gravity Equation (OLS) 
Dependent variable: bilateral parallel imports to the Netherlands (in ) itM
 Total sample (3.1) Restricted Sample* (3.2) Entry (Probit) (3.3) 
 coeff s.e t-value coeff s.e t-value coeff s.e t-value
)ln( jtit pp −  0.654b 0.259 2.53 2.070 a 0.305 6.78 0.313 b 0.145 2.15 
ijτ  -9.824a 2.426 -4.05 -9.15 b 3.488 -2.62 -6.50a 1.584 -4.1 
ijtξ  0.580 a 0.150 3.87 -1.28 a 0.165 -7.76 0.484a 0.085 5.67 [ ]
tjjii
PYPY )/)(/(ln  11.77a 3.528 3.34 -2.37 4.567 -0.52 9.902a 2.221 4.46 
tjiQQ )ln(  -3.292 a 1.164 -2.83 -4.25 a 1.533 -2.78 -2.31a 0.727 -3.17 
tjiYY )ln(  -0.350 0.325 -1.08 0.775 0.402 1.93 -0.527 b 0.200 -2.63 
tji )( ηη −  -1.027 0.382 -2.69 -0.657 0.459 -1.43 -0.83a 0.230 -3.64 
tji NN )( +  -0.019 0.210 -0.09 0.240 0.230 1.04 -0.085 0.120 -0.71 
Intercept -117.08a 30.78 -3.80 26.71 39.76 0.67 -95.69a 19.34 -4.95 
F-Test ( all coeff=0) 0.14   30.8 a      
R2 (Adjusted) 0.11   0.55      
N (No. of observations) 768.0   217.0      
Sargan Test 1.35   1.47      
N ( No. of Observations) 768   217   768   
Pseudo R2       0.10   
Likelihood Ratio 
2
9χ        87.06   
*Restricted to the existence of some parallel trade. 
Note: a denotes significance at 1% level, b denotes significance at 5% level. 
 
 
By undertaking the econometric estimation of the gravity equations following the 
premises of equation (2) we seek to analyse the determinants of parallel trade entry and 
penetration. Table 3 provides the estimates of an OLS model which includes equation 
(2) along with regulatory variables that influence the decision by local distributors 
(wholesalers) to sell to parallel exporters. Accordingly, we add the wholesalers’ mark-
up difference and the number of wholesalers to measure the effect of competitive 
conditions in the drug distribution system. Column (3.1) presents the determinants of 
total bilateral parallel trade. Column (3.2) shows the volume of parallel trade restricted 
to the existence of some penetration and column (3.3) shows the determinants of market 
entry. Our evidence suggests that total bilateral parallel trade increases with a higher 
price difference, as expected from a specific form of arbitrage (column 3.1). A 10% 
increase in the price difference between two countries leads to a 6.5% increase in 
bilateral parallel trade among them. When we split the sample with entry (probability of 
some parallel trade) and parallel trade penetration achieving market share for parallel 
traded statins, we find that the price difference is larger for a restricted OLS sample, and 
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indicates, for instance, that a 1% increase in the price difference between importing and 
exporting countries leads to a 2% expansion of parallel imports into the Netherlands. 
 
Parallel trade is explained by monetary barriers to trade – exchange rates – yet there is 
an apparent difference between the effect of exchange rates over total trade and entry on 
the one hand, and the effect of exchange rates over parallel import penetration on the 
other. This has to do with the fact that in some countries such as Spain and France the 
introduction of the euro has eliminated the exchange rate variability with the 
Netherlands, whilst some countries that remain outside the Eurozone entered the parallel 
trade business in the meantime (e.g. the United Kingdom). Transport costs – measured 
by distance – are responsible for a reduction in both entry and parallel trade penetration 
consistent with the prediction of a generalised gravity model. Indeed, the higher the 
distance between two countries, the lower the extent of bilateral parallel trade. The OLS 
model specification suggests that the economic mass of a country and the size of the 
therapeutic group are significant parallel trade entry determinants. However, a higher 
combined income per capita does not seem to influence parallel trade penetration once a 
product is already on the market. This feature can be explained by the fact that a 
combined higher income might well signal a higher capacity to restrict parallel trade 
from taking place. However, as expected, bilateral parallel trade flows increase with the 
size of the statins market. Finally, the variable measuring the difference in wholesaler 
mark-ups shows that the differences in the reimbursement of wholesalers amongst 
countries determines the entry decision to undertake parallel trade (column 3.3), 
consistent with our theoretical explanation and relevant literature (Maskus and Chen, 
2002; Maskus and Chen, 2004).  
 
Next, we tested for endogeneity resulting from the model specification by using the 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) augmented regression test, and found unambiguous 
evidence of endogeneity (F=15.08). Accordingly, we instrumented the price difference 
using data on pharmacist margins difference across countries ( tji )( ρρ − ) and the 
difference in the number of wholesalers across countries (in logs). The theoretical 
justification for including these variables as instruments lies in the fact that they are 
strongly associated with the formation of drug public prices given that both pharmacy 
margins (mark-ups) and the least competitive conditions for drug distribution are 
responsible for the formation of final public prices, whilst they do not appear to be 
associated (both in prior correlation analysis and in OLS regression models that include 
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this variable as a covariate) with parallel trade volume, given the latter is driven by the 
nature of incentives at wholesale level. On the other hand, parallel trade strongly is 
associated with price differences. Therefore, an instrumental variables (IV) estimation 
should provide a consistent estimate of the coefficients of interest and could well correct 
for any omitted variable bias (Angrist and Krueger, 2001).  
 
A key issue refers to the validity of the instruments. Table 4 provides the first stage of 
the models estimated and confirms that price differences depend on exchange rates, the 
competitive nature of the distribution chain and pharmacy mark-ups. The significance of 
all instruments indicates their goodness. Table 5 reports the results of a gravity equation 
estimated using instrumental variables. When the effect of potential endogeneity of 
price differences is accounted for, we find that price differences are not significantly 
associated with parallel trade. This can be explained by the fact that part of the price 
difference effect results from pharmaceutical market regulation, which in all European 
countries is significant, hence parallel trade becomes a regulation-induced phenomenon. 
This applies to both the full sample and the two-part model results.  
 
Table 4 
Price difference (in ) instrumental equations )( Xit
M
it PP −
 
 Total sample (A1.1) Restricted Sample (A1.2) IV Probit (A1.3) 
 coeff s.e t-value coeff s.e t-value coeff s.e t-value
ijτ  0.04 0.04 1.12 0.003 0.066 0.04 0.04 0.04 1.12
ijtξ  -1.28a 0.20 -6.52 -1.035 a 0.337 -3.07 -1.28 a 0.20 -6.55[ ]
tjjii
PYPY )/)(/(ln  -0.02 0.04 -0.36 0.024 0.081 0.29 -0.01 0.04 -0.36
tQQ ji )ln(  0.12a 0.04 2.75 0.063 0.085 0.75 0.12 b 0.04 2.77
tjiYY )ln(  -0.49b 0.24 -2.02 -0.532 0.457 -1.17 -0.49 b 0.24 -2.03
tji )( ηη −  -0.02 0.01 -1.93 -0.040 0.021 -1.92 -0.02 0.01 -1.94
tji NN )( +  0.005a 0.0001 4.89 0.003 a 0.001 3.82 0.005 a 0.0001 4.92
tji )( ρρ −  0.01b 0.00 2.14 0.019 a 0.005 3.60 0.01 b 0.00 2.13
Intercept 8.71 4.21 2.07 10.785 7.705 1.40 8.72 b 4.18 2.08
F Test (all coeff=0) 40.82 a 17.16 a   
R2 (Adjusted) 0.3 0.374   
N (Number of observations) 768 217 768  
 
Note: a denotes significance at 1% level, b denotes significance at 5% level. 
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Table 5 
Gravity equation 2SLS 
Dependent variable: bilateral parallel imports to the Netherlands (in ) itM
 Total sample (4.1) Restricted Sample* (4.2) Entry (IV Probit) (4.3) 
 coeff s.e t-value coeff s.e t-value coeff s.e t-value 
)ln( jtit pp −  2.41 1.52 1.59 1.782 1.062 1.68 0.44 0.82 0.54 
ijτ  0.07 0.35 0.21 -1.311a 0.274 -4.79 0.41 b 0.19 2.08 
ijtξ  -3.33 2.19 -1.52 -5.793a 1.708 -3.39 -2.55 b 1.25 -2.04 [ ]
tjjii
PYPY )/)(/(ln  -0.25 0.31 -0.83 -1.275a 0.318 -4.01 -0.18 0.17 -1.08 
tQQ ji )ln(  0.26 0.25 1.06 1.049a 0.294 3.57 -0.07 0.13 -0.49 
tjiYY )ln(  2.11 1.36 1.55 -2.760 1.458 -1.89 2.41a 0.77 3.14 
ln tji )( ηη −  -0.22 b 0.09 -2.52 -0.099 0.081 -1.23 -0.16 a 0.05 -3.30 
Intercept -43.30 22.97 -1.89 53.13b 23.85 2.23 -47.07 a 12.91 -3.65 
F Test (all coeff=0) 12.68 a   33.37 a      
R2 (Adjusted) 0.06   0.57      
N 768   217   768   
Sargan Test 1.78   1.68      
Wald 27χ )0( =∇ iβ        76.54   
Wald endogeneity test 21χ        0.02   
* Restricted to the existence of some parallel trade.  
Note: a denotes significance at 1% level, b denotes significance at 5% level. 
 
 
When IV estimation is implemented, exchange rates exhibit the expected effects. 
Distance appears to be reducing the total volume of bilateral parallel trade to the 
Netherlands and entry into the parallel trade business. However, it exhibits an opposite 
coefficient for penetration (volume). This has to do with the fact that once parallel 
traders have established contacts with a potential source, distance does not become a 
significant barrier and it might well be that relatively distant sources geographically 
have incentives to become better connected. Yet, whilst richer countries tend to be less 
likely to parallel export, those countries that have larger market sizes for statins are 
more likely to ship larger quantities to the Netherlands. The other findings indicate that 
there is some evidence that economic size explains entry and the difference in 
wholesaler mark-ups also explains parallel trade as before, although the sign is not as 
expected. This may be due to the fact that some unobserved heterogeneity might 
remain, so that the variable captures country-specific effects associated with wholesaler 
mark-ups, ultimately suggesting the need to explore a specification using panel data.  
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Table 6 
Random effects 2SGLS (in ) itM
Dependent variable: bilateral parallel imports to the Netherlands 
 
 Total sample (5.1) Restricted sample* (5.2) 
 coeff s.e t-value coeff s.e t-value 
)ln( jtit pp −  5.02 12.52 0.40 -2.108 1.892 -1.110 
ijτ  -0.06 2.37 -0.03 0.510 0.477 1.070 
ijtξ  11.10 20.75 0.54 -1.619 4.203 -0.390 [ ]
tjjii
PYPY )/)(/(ln  0.87 1.43 0.61 -0.367 0.525 -0.700 
tQQ ji )ln(  -0.42 0.29 -1.47 -0.230 0.125 -1.840 
tjiYY )ln(  5.44 3.40 1.60 3.079 a 0.844 3.650 
Ln tji )( ηη −  0.42b 0.19 2.15 0.174 a 0.046 3.760 
Intercept -114.20b 54.74 -2.09 -58.507 14.452 -4.050 
N (Number of Observations) 768   217   
Wald 27χ )0( =∇ iβ  108.2   3631   
R2 (Adjusted) 0.02   0.72   
 
* Restricted to the existence of some parallel trade.  
Note: a denotes significance at 1% level, b denotes significance at 5% level. 
 
 
Despite the analysis and results so far, it may be the case that some country- and 
product-specific effects might be in place, or generally speaking, some unobserved 
heterogeneity might be present. This could be corrected using panel data analysis. By 
including time-series cross sectional data the results could capture the effect of 
unobservable variables. We employ a random effect and a fixed effects specification in 
Tables 6 and 7 respectively. The Breusch Pagan test does not reveal that a fixed effects 
specification is more efficient and the Sargan test shows no evidence of over-
identification. Table 6 provides evidence suggesting that economic size does exert an 
effect in explaining parallel trade penetration, and we find evidence that the difference 
in the wholesaler mark-ups increases bilateral flows of parallel traded drugs although 
the fixed effect specification (Table 7) reveals additional evidence of income and 
volume effects, suggesting that whilst total income fosters the development of parallel 
trade, both total product sales (volume) and per capita GDP do not significantly explain 
the development of parallel trade. The fixed effects specification drops the distance 
variable as expected, given that distance does not vary over time and this specification 
reveals economic size and income per capita as significant, in addition to wholesaler 
mark-ups which exhibit the expected sign.  
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Table 7 
Fixed effects 2SGLS  
Dependent variable: bilateral parallel imports to the Netherlands (in ) itM
 
 Total sample (6.1) Restricted sample (6.2) 
 coeff s.e t-value Coeff s.e t-value 
)ln( jtit pp −  -11.30a 3.71 -3.04 -0.999 0.826 -1.210 
ijtξ  -9.51 7.21 -1.32 2.731 1.708 1.600 [ ]
tjjii
PYPY )/)(/(ln  -93.67a 32.09 -2.92 -18.89 b 7.428 -2.540 
tQQ ji )ln(  -0.47 0.44 -1.05 -0.236 b 0.112 -2.100 
tjiYY )ln(  89.73 a 27.85 3.22 19.01 a 6.405 2.970 
tji )( ηη −  0.33b 0.13 2.44 0.200 a 0.034 5.890 
Intercept -58.50 a 14.45 4.05 -378.4 a 127.024 -2.980 
Wald Test 27χ  )0( =∇ iβ  480.9   9503.1   
N (Number of Observations) 768   217   
730,31F  19.19 a   53.5 a   
R2 (Adjusted) 0.02   0.05   
Note: a denotes significance at 1% level, b denotes significance at 5% level. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the determinants of flows of parallel traded drugs into the 
Netherlands, by using proprietary IMS data on statins over the 1997-2002 period. As 
patents protected all statins during the study period, and therefore the only source of 
competition to a statin was from a parallel traded equivalent. Specifically, the paper 
approximated the impact that country-specific regulation of the distribution chain in 
exporting (e.g. Spain, France etc) and importing countries (The Netherlands) has on the 
proliferation of parallel trade in proprietary medicines. By focusing on in-patent 
medicines only, the paper examined the effect parallel trade has on the destination 
country. It also isolated and empirically analysed the contribution of the degree of 
competition and market regulation in the drug distribution system in both the country of 
origin and destination. Finally, the paper took into consideration a number of country-
specific effects and it can be argued that this unambiguously demonstrates that 
pharmaceutical parallel trade is a regulation-induced phenomenon, consistent with 
theoretical predictions in similar settings (Peccorino, 2002).  
 
The paper specified a battery of gravity models and controlled for a number of 
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econometric issues such as the existence of endogeneity, a two-part process, as well as 
potential time-series cross-section effects. The results suggest that parallel trade is a 
specific phenomenon that mainly takes place at the distribution level, and therefore 
changes in the expected profit of wholesalers stand as a key determining factor in 
addition to pharmaceutical price regulation. Indeed, even if price differences between 
two countries are significant, the lack of competitive pressures in drug distribution 
might inhibit parallel trade between them. This is similar to the finding of Maskus and 
Chen (2002, 2004), who suggest that parallel trade might be the natural result of the 
absence of vertical control in the distribution process. An explanation of the expansion 
of parallel trade from Spain into the Netherlands refers to the regulation of drugs 
distribution in place in Spain which induces some wholesalers to undertake parallel 
exporting activities. Indeed, wholesalers’ mark-up in Spain is limited to roughly 8% and 
has declined over time, which in addition to the competitive environment defined by a 
large number of companies in the market, makes parallel trade attractive to some 
specialised wholesalers in a number of high volume drugs. 
 
Within the context of the present study, the rationale for the proliferation of parallel 
trade is exclusively pecuniary rather than promoting access to medicines and 
distributional equity across or within countries: wholesalers in exporting countries may 
have small domestic market shares exerting a downward influence on their total mark-
up and profit functions. Consequently, they would have an incentive to increase their 
payoffs by diverting part of the stock purchased for the needs of the country they serve 
to other countries. They are incentivised to do so because they may be receiving 
payment on time and from a single source (parallel importer) rather than expecting 
payment from several sources (individual pharmacies in their domestic market). 
Consequently, parallel trade is not only the result of significant price differences and 
differential regulation, but is also determined by the structure of the (wholesale) drug 
distribution chain in exporting countries, how wholesale distribution is regulated and the 
overall competitive environment that results from such regulation. It is also dependent 
on the incentive structure of the distribution chain in the importing country (in this case, 
The Netherlands).  
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